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E ACH year every American individual income taxpayer faces a
choice when he fills out his Form 1040:' whether to elect the
so-called standard deduction2 or to take the option of itemizing his
personal deductions. 3 Making this choice is relatively simple, for a
taxpayer usually need only compare his allowable personal deductions
to the amount of his standard deduction. If the total of his deductions
exceeds the amount of the standard deduction, he will choose to
itemize his deductions; 4 otherwise, he will generally 5 elect the standard
deduction.
There are at least one hundred and sixty-seven 6 other elections
available to taxpayers under the Internal Revenue Code, but few are
as simple or clear-cut as the standard deduction. Before a taxpayer
makes a Code election, he should analyze at least three critical factors:
(1) the tax effects of the election;7 (2) the method of making the
election; and (3) the time period within which the election must be
filed." Of these by far the most difficult is determining the tax
consequences of a given election. One problem is that many elections
affect an individual's tax situation for many years subsequent to the
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor Yorio received
his B.A. from Columbia University and his J.D. from Harvard University.
1. The taxpayer makes this election on line 45 of Internal Revenue Service Form 1040.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 63(b), 141-44.
3. Id. § 63(a).
4. Since it is usually much simpler to elect the standard deduction, occasionally a taxpayer
will elect the standard deduction even though it results in a higher tax simply to avoid the
increased difficulty inherent in itemizing personal deductions.
5. In rare instances a taxpayer will choose to itemize even though his personal deductions are
less than the standard deduction because certain tax credits are not available to a taxpayer who
elects the standard deduction. The credit for income taxes imposed by foreign countries is
probably the most important example. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 33, 36.
6. See 1 P-H 1968 Tax Ideas 19,006.
7. The analysis in notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text on the standard deduction is an
elementary example.
8. The literature on factors which are important in making elections under the Code is
extensive. A few of the leading articles are little, Saving Taxes by Proper Elections, 18 Tul. Tax
Inst. 613 (1969); Meyer, Making and Rescinding Tax Accounting Elections, N.Y.U. 30th Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 1691 (1972); Stine, Some Important Factors in Making Elections Under the Internal
Revenue Code, 16 U. So. Cal. 1964 Tax Inst. 635.
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year of the election. 9 Consequently, whether or not to make the election
will depend to some extent on the individual's projected future income
flow. Some elections may be unwise because they preclude the tax-
payer from securing other advantages under the Code.' 0 Occasionally
the advisability of a tax election depends on economic conditions other
than the taxpayer's own projected income flow;" at other times an
election will be advantageous only if tax rates remain constant. 12 In
short, to make a wise election a taxpayer must add to the skills of the
tax expert the science of an economist and the prescience of a prophet.
A taxpayer must be very careful, too, that he conform to the
prescribed method for making a Code election,' 3 since these methods
vary considerably. Filing a return with one's spouse, for example,
constitutes an election to file a joint return. 14 Filling in the appropriate
line on Form 1040 is an election between the standard deduction and
itemized deductions.' 5 For some elections the taxpayer must file a
special form; 16 at other times he must attach a statement to his tax
return.' 7 Equally important is that the taxpayer file his election on
time. 8 While many elections must be made at the time the taxpayer's
return is filed, 19 the requirements are by no means uniform. In some
instances the Code itself specifies a time period for making the elec-
tion; 20 more commonly, regulations issued by the Internal Revenue
9. An example is the choice between depreciating an asset on the straightline basis or on an
accelerated basis. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. In National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 908 (1965), the taxpayer made an election, the wisdom of which depended on rising zinc
prices. Zinc prices fell, and the taxpayer sought and succeeded in revoking his election before the
time period for the original election had expired. Id. at 137-38.
12. In Stewart v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 221 (D. Neb. 1951), the taxpayer's failure to
elect to include an item in income for 1942 resulted in a considerable tax loss when the item had
to be included in his 1943 income after federal income tax rates had risen steeply. Id. at 226.
13. Failure to file in the manner prescribed by the Service may invalidate an attempted
election. Lambert v. Commissioner, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1510, 1512 (1963).
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1, 6013(b)(1).
15. See note I supra.
16. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.108(a)-2, T.D. 6928, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 250, 251 (Form
982-election to exclude income from discharge of indebtedness); Treas. Reg. § 1.333-3 (1955)
(Form 964-election not to recognize certain gain in a liquidation).
17. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(c) (1956) (election to amortize organizational expenses).
18. See, e.g., J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 58-59 (1940); Simons v.
United States, 208 F. Supp. 744, 746 (D. Conn. 1962) (attempted election one day late held
ineffective).
19. The elections to file a joint return, to take the standard deduction, and to depreciate on
the straightline or on an accelerated basis are three of the most common examples.
20. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 333(d) (election must be made within 30 days after the
adoption of a plan of liquidation of a corporation); id. § 1372(c)(1) (election to be taxed as a
Subchapter S corporation must be made during the first month of the corporation's taxable year
or during the month preceding).
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Service prescribe the permissible period. 21
Most laymen are ill-equipped to make an election, even if they are
aware that it is available. Even with tax advice from an accountant or
lawyer, often the wrong choice is made or the proper choice is made
incorrectly. 22 Given these obstacles, it would seem that relief should
sometimes be given to a taxpayer who, by mistake or inadvertence,
has made an unwise election. Yet prominent authority, including a
Supreme Court 23 case and a leading treatise, 24 suggests that, with rare
exceptions, an election once made will be binding. The aim of this
Article is to determine under what circumstances a taxpayer should be
allowed to revoke, to change or to make a late federal income tax
election.25
I1. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
With the ratification of the sixteenth amendment on February 25,
1913, and the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1913 a few months
later, 26 American courts faced for the first time the problem of
interpreting a national individual income tax on a continuing basis. "
Faced with a statute without a case law tradition of its own, the courts
21. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(3)(i), T.D. 7073, 1970-2 Cum. Bull. 98, 100 (election to
change method of accounting must be filed within 180 days after the beginning of the taxable
year).
22. The instances of improper tax election advice from a lawyer or an accountant are legion.
Some of the more egregious reported examples are: Youngblood v. United States. 388 F. Supp.
152 (W.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 507 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1975) (installment election by
agent valid though unknown to taxpayer); Kiesling v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Tex.
1958) (accountant's misadvice regarding community property;, refiling permitted); see Mamula v.
Commissioner, 346 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer allowed to elect installment method under
section 453 after an audit uncovered a mistake by a certified public accountant).
23. J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55 (1940). See notes 45-53 infra and
accompanying text
24. J. Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation § 60.19, at 85 (rev. ed. 1970).
25. The Code itself makes some elections revocable for a certain period. See, e.g., Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 901(a) (election to take foreign tax credit). Also, some sections authorize the
Secretary to prescribe regulations governing a change of election. See, e.g., id. § 144(b); Treas.
Reg. § 1.144-2(a), T.D. 6792, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 69, 85 (election to take standard deduction). The
Service has issued rulings authorizing taxpayers to revoke an election or to make a late election.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 Cum. Bull. 152. The Commissioner can give advance
approval to a taxpayer wishing to revoke even without an authorizing Code section, regulation,
or ruling. See Stine, Some Important Factors in Mtaking Elections Under the Internal Revenue
Code, 16 U. So. Cal. 1964 Tax Inst. 635, 645.
This Article will focus on cases involving revocations which the Service resists, and for
which the taxpayer can find no explicit authority in either the Code, regulations, or rulings.
26. Act of Oct- 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
27. While the Civil War income tax first enacted in 1862 continued in effect until 1873,
Congress repeatedly reduced its incidence. E. Seligman, The Income Tax 430-81 (1914). The 1894
tax was found unconstitutional soon after its effective date. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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sometimes borrowed precedents from older areas of the law, 28 and in
the interpretation of income tax elections this conscious borrowing was
common. In an early decision, McIntosh v. Wilkinson, 29 in which a
taxpayer had sought to revoke an income tax election made by
mistake, the court assumed that the governing rules for elections under
the income tax were the same as the principles developed for elections
in the courts of equity. One important authority for the court, there-
fore, was Pomeroy's treatise on equity which states that an election in
equity is revocable when the election has been made under mistake of
fact. 30
Other courts, following the lead of McIntosh, have held that an
election was revocable only if made under a mistake of fact and that a
mistake of law would not suffice. 31 A simple example illustrating this
dichotomy might involve the standard deduction. 32 A taxpayer adds
up his personal deductions, but forgets that he has made a substantial
charitable contribution to his local church. As a consequence, he elects
the standard deduction. This election, grounded on a mistake of fact,
would be revocable. By contrast, if the taxpayer failed to add the
contribution in the belief that charitable contributions were not deduct-
ible, his election would not be revocable since his mistake was an
improper interpretation of the law.
It is hard to understand why the taxpayer's mistake of fact in the
above example would allow him to revoke his election, but his mistake
of law would not. While an occasional court has questioned the
wisdom of the dichotomy, 33 courts still refuse to permit a taxpayer to
revoke an election for a mistake of law. 34 Neither McIntosh nor any
28. See Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948) (on equitable principles, unpaid
salary held to constitute constructive receipt, not taxable in later year); Bennet v. Helvering, 137
F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1943) (on equitable principles, failure to declare an item as income in prior year
found not to prevent allowance of loss on same item as deduction in later year).
29. 36 F.2d 807 (E.D. Wis. 1929).
30. J. Pomeroy, 2 A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 512 (5th ed. 1941).
31. Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1952); John D. Biggers, 39
B.T.A. 480 (1939).
32. It should be noted that, since an election of the standard deduction is revocable pursuant
to Treas. Reg. § 1.144-2(a), T.D. 6792, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 69, 85, this example has more
academic than practical interest.
33. Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1942). See Clift & Goodrich,
Inc. v. United States, 56 F.2d 751, 752 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 617 (1932)
("[T]he old notion that a mistake of law will not serve ...still prolongs its discreditable life
34. Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1963); Raymond v. United States,
269 F.2d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1959); Rosenfield v. United States, 254 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958); Aaron Cohen, 63 T.C. No. 49 (Feb. 3, 1975). It should be pointed
out that the McIntosh case itself arguably involved a mistake of law, in that the taxpayer's
[Vol. 44
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other decision has explained why mistakes of fact are accorded prefer-
ential treatment. Since there is no satisfactory policy reason for the
distinction, and since the Supreme Court has never adopted the
language of Mclntosh,35 it is time for courts to drop the distinction.
Some other early decisions 36 pursued a different and much more
generous course. These courts adopted the view that a relief provision
enacted by Congress should be liberally construed in favor of the
taxpayer. Thus, revocation of a mistaken election was permitted
whenever the election provision had been enacted to provide relief to
the taxpayer. The Supreme Court, in Pacific National Co. v. Welch 37
and J.E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner,38 rejected this argu-
ment. Since every election is arguably a relief provision enacted by
Congress for the taxpayer's benefit, to allow a taxpayer freely to revoke
an election for that reason alone would "impose burdensome uncertain-
ties upon the administration of the revenue laws."139
Other courts went too far in the opposite direction, reasoning that
since an election is afforded as a matter of legislative grace the
taxpayer must comply strictly with its requirements. Thus, an election
once made should be binding once and forever. 40 Given the uncertain-
ties and difficulties in making many elections, 4 1 it would be Draconian
to hold taxpayers to such high standards. Many elections would
become traps for the unwary and only those taxpayers with the best
tax advice would be secure.
In addition, simply because Congress is not required to offer an
election, it does not necessarily follow that an election, once enacted,
should be construed strictly against the taxpayer.42 If Congress, with
the power to decide tax policy, adopts a certain election, it would be
original imprudent election resulted from his acceptance of incorrect tax advice from an agent of
the Internal Revenue Service.
35. The Supreme Court cases are J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55 (1940),
Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389 (1940), and Pacific Natl Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191
(1938), none of which alludes to the mistake of fact-law dichotomy.
36. Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 1952); Gentsch v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 151 F.2d 997, 1000-01 (6th Cir. 1945); C.H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 106 F.2d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 1939).
37. 304 U.S. 191 (1938).
38. 311 U.S. 55, 58-59 (1940). See notes 45-53 infra and accompanying text.
39. 304 U.S. at 194.
40. Sarah Briarly, 29 B.T.A. 256, 258-59 (1933).
41. See notes 6-21 supra and accompanying text.
42. This argument recalls the adage that deductions, as manifestations of congressional
beneficence, are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer. In the context of deductions this
view has been persuasively criticized. Note, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions




more reasonable for a court to allow a taxpayer to retract a mistaken
election whenever his mistake thwarts the policy behind the election so
long as a retraction would do no violence to any other important tax
policy. 4
3
The preceding discussion should show that early court decisions on
the revocability of tax elections went astray in two respects. In some
instances courts relied on established equitable principles which could
not thrive as transplants in the field of income taxation. In other cases
courts mistakenly tried to formulate a general rule to cover all cases,
and in an area as complex and diverse as tax elections, a broad-brush
approach had to fail.
The failure of the lower courts in these early decisions to resolve the
problems arising from mistaken elections resulted in Supreme Court
intervention. The last of these Supreme Court opinions, 44 J.E. Riley
Investment Co. v. Commissioner,45 represents the high-water mark of
opposition to taxpayer attempts to revoke an election or to make a late
election. The taxpayer was a corporation engaged in mining in Flat,
Alaska. Because the winter mail service between Flat and Tacoma
was uncertain and slow, the taxpayer customarily filed its tax returns
early on a form for an earlier year in order to avoid a delinquency
assessment. On January 2, 1935, the taxpayer executed his return for
calendar year 1934 on a 1933 form. At that time the taxpayer was
unaware of the provision in the 1934 Revenue Act allowing percentage
depletion and, since the taxpayer had no basis for cost depletion, it did
not deduct any depletion for calendar year 1934. About eight months
later the taxpayer first learned of the statutory provision for percentage
depletion, and some months thereafter it filed an amended return upon
which a deduction for percentage depletion was taken and a refund
was claimed. 46 The Commissioner refused to accept the amended
return and the Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner's ruling.
The Court gave two reasons to support its holding, one based on the
statute, the other on administrative policy. The 1934 Revenue Act
read, in relevant part, as follows:
A taxpayer making his first return under this title in respect of a property shall state
whether he elects to have the depletion allowance for such property for the taxable
year for which the return is made computed with or without regard to percentage
depletion .... If the taxpayer fails to make such statement in the return, the depletion
43. "The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and If it has
intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed." Johnson v.
United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (Holmes, J.) (construing federal evidence statute).
44. See note 35 supra.
45. 311 U.S. 55 (1940).
46. Id. at 56-57.
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allowance for such property for such year shall be computed without reference to
percentage depletion.47
The Supreme Court concluded that the taxpayer's return executed on
January 2, 1935 was its "first return" within the meaning of the
statute. Since the taxpayer had not elected percentage depletion on
that return, it was barred from computing depletion on that basis in its
amended return filed on March 3, 1936.48 This interpretation is not an
unreasonable reading of the statute although less than one year earlier
the Supreme Court had itself expanded the meaning of "first return" to
embrace an amended return which was filed before the original period
for filing a return had elapsed. 49 Considering the plight of the taxpayer
in Riley, the Court could have easily gone one step further to include
within the definition of "first return" an amended return filed within
the statutory limitation period of three years.
The Court also offered a policy reason to support its holding.
If petitioner's view were adopted, taxpayers with the benefit of hindsight could shift
from one basis of depletion to another in light of developments subsequent to their
original choice. It seems clear that Congress provided that the election must be made
once and for all in the first return in order to avoid any such shifts.5 0
Although it is true that as a general rule taxpayers should not be
allowed to change tax elections with the benefit of hindsight,5 ' the
taxpayer in Riley was clearly not shifting to percentage depletion for
such a reason. Since at the time he filed his original return he had no
basis on which to deduct cost depletion, his only sensible choice, if he
had known about the new provision, would have been percentage
depletion. The Court offered a convincing reason for not allowing a
revocation in certain cases, but it was a reason which was inapposite
to the case before it.
Many subsequent lower court opinions have cited Riley for the
proposition that an election once made is irrevocable.52 It is submitted
that the reasoning of the Court in Riley was incorrect except for its
arguably sound statutory interpretation. In any event, since the Su-
preme Court has not reviewed this issue in thirty-five years, the Riley
case should not be taken as a talisman.53
47. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 114(b)(4), 48 Stat. 680, 710-11 (emphasis added).
48. 311 U.S. at 57-59.
49. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389 (1940).
50. 311 U.S. at 59.
51. See notes 145-51 infra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792, 794 (10th Cir. 1963); Keeler v.
Commissioner, 180 F.2d 707, 710 (10th Cir. 1950); Schall & Co. v. United States, 129 F. Supp.
137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
53. In addition, since the Court in Riley relied on the peculiar language of the Revenue Act of
1934, any later case may be distinguished from it.
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II. SOME PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. Burden of Proof
Many courts place the burden of proving certain issues on the
taxpayer seeking to revoke a tax election. 54 Usually the taxpayer must
establish: (1) that the election (or failure to make an election) was the
result of a mistake;55 and (2) that the mistake was a mistake at the
time of the election.5 6 Placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer
seems reasonable since the taxpayer, having had his chance and
muffed it, is asking the court to allow him to repudiate it and to upset
the normal workings of tax administration. Since "the idea of repose in
tax matters is genuinely important, ' 57 the taxpayer should be required
to present a convincing case before a court tampers with the status
quo.
B. The Statute of Limitations
For the same reasons that statutes of limitations have been enacted
to bar actions after a particular time,58 there should be a limitation
period after which a taxpayer will not be allowed to revoke an election
no matter how compelling his case. The usual limitation period for
claiming a refund or credit under the federal income tax is three
years, 59 and a similar period might be appropriate for revoking a tax
election. While one authority60 has argued that in cases of mistake the
statute of limitations should be tolled until the taxpayer discovers or
should discover his mistake, 61 the Service would have a persuasive
54. See, e.g., Estate of George Stamos, 55 T.C. 468 (1970) (taxpayer failed to prove that lie
had made a mistake of fact); Sam Goldman, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 936 (1950) (taxpayer failed to
offer evidence of his own intent when making an election).
55. Occasionally a taxpayer makes an election the wisdom of which depends on an optimistic
view of the tax effect of an unrelated transaction in the hope that his election may be revoked if
his view is found to be incorrect. Such conduct is not entirely innocent and perhaps is not even a
mistake. It is unclear whether the taxpayer should be entitled to relief. See notes 143-44 infra
and accompanying text.
56. An election which turns out to be ill-advised because of subsequent events should not be
revocable. See notes 145-51 infra and accompanying text.
57. Maguire & Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation, 48 Harv.
L. Rev. 1281, 1331 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Maguire & Zimet].
58. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1185-86
(1950).
59. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6511.
60. Maguire & Zimet, supra note 57, at 1330-31.
61. Id. The authors rely on the apparent old rule that when money is paid under mistake the
statute of limitations begins to run when the claimant discovered or should have discovered the
mistake. See J. Lightwood, The Time Limit for Actions 239 (1909). Some modern statutes reject
this rule. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(6) (McKinney 1972). The Internal Revenue Code itself
generally rejects this approach. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6511.
FEDERAL TAX ELECTIONS
argument for a more stringent rule since a change in a tax election
could affect the returns and tax liability of a taxpayer for many
years. 62 To protect the Service against delayed revocations which
could severely burden tax administration, a limitation period of three
years from the date the election is made might be advisable. 63
Congressional action would be necessary to establish an absolute
statute of limitations for revocations, but even without a statute,
courts have imposed their own informal limitation period. Some courts
have denied relief to taxpayers whose revocations were filed too late6
and one court distinguished an earlier pro-taxpayer decision by point-
ing out that in the earlier case, the taxpayer revoked within one year
after his original election, while in the case before the court, the
taxpayer's attempt to revoke came more than four years after his
election. 6s Even in the absence of congressional action, therefore,
courts should weigh the timeliness of a revocation in deciding whether
to grant relief to the taxpayer.
C. Revocations Within the Time Period
for the Election
The converse of a delayed revocation is a revocation made before
the period for the original election has elapsed. National Lead Co. v.
Commissioner66 involved an election provision which gave taxpayers a
one year period to select between inventory methods. The taxpayer
filed his election, but sought to revoke the election before the expira-
tion of the one year period. The Second Circuit, reversing the Tax
Court, held in favor of the taxpayer on the grounds that the govern-
ment would in no way be prejudiced by a revocation before the end of
the election period.67
This holding is no doubt sound since a different result would trap
those unwary taxpayers who make elections too soon, while the
response of the wise taxpayer would be simply to wait until the latest
possible moment before committing himself to an election. One Su-
preme Court decision supports this result. 68 Though the argument of
62. See note 9 supra.
63. At least one supporter of a more liberal revocation policy in general is willing to accept a
three year limitation period. Stine, Some Important Factors in Making Elections Under the
Internal Revenue Code, 16 U. So. Cal. 1964 Tax Inst. 635, 655.
64. See, e.g., Momsen-Dunnegan-Ryan Co. v. Helvering, 68 F.2d 754, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
65. Youngblood v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 152, 154-55 (W.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd per
curiam, 507 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1975), distinguishing C.H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 106
F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1939).
66. 336 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965), rev'g 40 T.C. 282 (1963).
67. Id. at 139.
68. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389 (1940). The revocation in McIntosh v. Wilkinson,
1975]
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the Court turned mainly on a narrow point of statutory interpretation,
the Court did emphasize the policy argument that "no interest of the
Government would have been harmed had the Commissioner . . .
accepted the petitioner's amended declaration. '69 If the government
allows a certain time for making an election, it is unlikely that any
interest of tax administration would be hurt by allowing a retraction of
the election within that same time period.
IV. SITUATIONS IN WHICH COURTS FAVOR
THE TAXPAYER
A. Scrivener's Errors and the Like
Occasionally a taxpayer intending to make one election mistakenly
fills in the opposite on his return. If the taxpayer's calculations on the
same return indicate his actual intent, a court will allow the taxpayer
to correct his return. 70 Even when the return itself does not reveal the
error, a court should allow a taxpayer to change his election if he can
prove that he (or his agent) filled out the return incorrectly. 7 1
A bit more difficult are those cases in which a taxpayer deliberately
elects one alternative, but calculations on the same return or on a
later return indicate that he misuiderstood the effect of the election. In
Rosenfield v. United States,7 2 an attorney incorrectly advised an
executor that the election of the optional valuation date for estate tax
purposes allowed the estate to value each asset at the date of death
value or on the alternate valuation date, whichever was lower.
71
Based on this advice the estate elected the optional valuation date
valuing the assets as the lawyer had instructed. When the Service
assessed a deficiency against the estate, the executor sought to revoke
the election and to value all the estate's assets as of the date of death.
74
36 F.2d 807 (E.D. Wis. 1929), also occurred before the expiration of the election period, but the
court apparently did not rely on that fact in finding for the taxpayer. See notes 29-30 supra and
accompanying text.
69. 308 U.S. at 394-95.
70. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 722 (D.S.D. 1949).
71. Closely analogous are those cases in contract in which courts, by reforming a written
instrument which contains a scrivener's error, enforce the contract in accordance with the parties'
actual intent. See 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 614 (1960); 13 S. Williston, Contracts §§ 1547-49A (3d
ed. W. Jaeger 1970).
72. 254 F.2d 940 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958), aff'g 156 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.
Pa. 1957).
73. Election of the alternate valuation date generally allows an estate to value all of its assets
as of that date; the election does not give the estate a choice of valuation dates for each asset. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032.
74. The executor also argued that since the alternate valuation date had been applied to only
(Vol. 44
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The Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court, which
stated that once "an election has been made, it cannot be revoked to
secure tax advantages after the time for filing the tax return has
passed.175
The lower court's argument is puzzling, for it seems to confuse the
executor's dilemma with those very different situations in which
taxpayers try to revoke elections when subsequent non-tax events
make the elections disadvantageous. 76 The court is quite right that
taxpayers should not be allowed to revoke elections on the basis of
hindsight, 77 but in Rosenfield hindsight could not have been a factor in
the revocation because the executor, had he understood the election,
would have known at that time everything he needed to know to make
the more advantageous choice.78 The executor was therefore motivated
to revoke not by a view of events subsequent to his election, but
simply because of his misconstruction of the effects of the original
election. The Rosenfield opinion might make some sense, however, if
the court really suspected that the executor deliberately misread the
statute and, when the Service caught the discrepancy, wanted to
revoke.7 9 But if a taxpayer's treatment of an election on his return
indicates that he misunderstood the election, and the taxpayer proves"
a portion of the assets of the estate (the favorable portion), this action, since it was contrary to the
statute, was not a true election. The executor urged, therefore, that the date of death values must
be used. 156 F. Supp. at 782. The district court rejected the argument: "In the present case the
decision of the estate upon the advice of counsel to elect the optional valuation was an unwise
decision, but certainly it was a real decision and the election of the optional valuation date was a
real election." Id.
The taxpayer's argument finds some support in the field of remedies. Where a plaintiff sues
for an unavailable remedy and is denied relief on that basis, some authorities argue that his
"election" of a remedy that is not available is not an election at all and, for that reason, he should
not be barred from suing for another remedy. See Restatement of Judgments § 65, Comment a
(1942); D. Dobbs, Remedies § 1.5, at 20 (1973). However, this technical approach should not be
adopted in income tax cases where there are often substantial policy reasons for allowing (or
refusing to allow) a taxpayer to change his "election."
75. 156 F. Supp. at 783.
76. A good example might be a taxpayer who elects straightline depreciation. If he later
determines that his gross income is higher than expected, he might want to shift to accelerated
depreciation to offset that income.
77. See notes 145-51 infra and accompanying text.
78. At the time of the election (which was subsequent to the alternate valuation date) the
taxpayer could have determined the value of the estate's assets both as of the date of death and as
of the alternate valuation date. That was the only information he required to minimize the estate tax,
though the income tax effects of later sales might vary with the valuation date.
79. There is no indication that this was the case. Indeed, the lower court clearly accepted the
taxpayer's version of the events leading to his election. 156 F. Supp. at 782.
80. The burden of proof becomes crucial. The mere fact that the taxpayer's calculations are
inconsistent with his election may not in itself be sufficient to prove that the misinterpretation was
innocent. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
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that his apparent misunderstanding was real, he should be allowed to
revoke.
B. Mistakes Caused by Advice from a Government Officer or Agent
Two relatively early cases8 involved taxpayers who alleged that
their mistaken elections were caused by incorrect legal advice from an
employee of the Internal Revenue Service. As already noted, 82 the
court in McIntosh held for the taxpayer primarily on the grounds that
a similar mistaken election would have been revocable in a court of
equity. The court apparently did not rely on the agent's misinforma-
tion in deciding against the government, though it is conceivable that
the court weighed this fact in the taxpayer's favor. In John D. Biggers
8 3
the Board of Tax Appeals held against the taxpayer, over a strong
dissent, for three principal reasons: (1) his mistake was a mistake of
law which supposedly does not excuse an incorrect election; 84 (2) a
taxpayer cannot succeed in a suit against the government by relying on
the advice of a government agent;8 5 and (3) representations made by
an agent of the Service are not binding against the government. 86
The Board's second argument seems to be an evidentiary one, for
the court emphasized that "[n]either the official status of the person
advising petitioner, nor that of his consultants, is disclosed. ' 87 To be
sure, if a taxpayer simply alleges that an agent gave him bad advice,
but offers no evidence as to the identity of the agent nor presents any
other proof that he had in fact received incorrect advice from the
Service, his claim should be dismissed unless he presents some other
facts to support his revocation. Again, the burden of proof is critical.88
A court should demand that the taxpayer present evidence not only
that a specific agent advised him incorrectly, but that he relied on the
advice in making his election.
Let us assume, however, that the taxpayer establishes that an agent
gave him an incorrect opinion on which he relied to his detriment.
This raises the court's third argument that representations of a
government agent do not bind the government, and that as a "general
rule . . . estoppel can not apply against the Government .. "89 It is
81. McIntosh v. Wilkinson, 36 F.2d 807 (E.D. Wis. 1929); John D. Biggers, 39 B.T.A. 480
(1939).
82. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
83. 39 B.T.A. 480 (1939).
84. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
85. 39 B.T.A. at 486.
86. Id.
87, Id.
88, See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
89. 39 B.T.A. at 486.
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true that many cases hold that the government may not be estopped by
the acts of its agents. 90 The rationale for the rule is that each agent, as
but one of thousands representing the government, has limited power.
Where conflicts of opinion between various agents are common, it
would be illogical for each to be able to bind the government. 91
On the other hand, some cases present strong equitable arguments
for the taxpayer. In Biggers, the taxpayer alleged that he was told by
an agent that he could not file separate returns, but had to file jointly
with his wife. Wishing to comply, the taxpayer filed a joint return.
Later, realizing the agents mistake, he tried to revoke and file sepa-
rately as he was originally entitled to do. It is submitted that under
these facts a court ought to allow the taxpayer to revoke his original
election for reasons of fairness without, however, adopting a general
rule that the government may be estopped by the acts of its agents.
Other situations may be less compelling for the taxpayer. Suppose in
the Biggers situation, for example, that the agent advises the taxpayer
(correctly) that he could file either a joint return or a separate return,
but (incorrectly) that a joint return would result in less tax. The
taxpayer who files a joint return unwisely has a less persuasive claim
to relief, for no longer can he argue that the agent's advice left him no
choice, but only that the advice induced him to make the wrong
choice. The taxpayer has not been coerced into a mistake; he has only
been coaxed into it, and that may be a crucial distinction for a court
balancing the equities of his case. Yet, since the taxpayer's tax loss is
no less real, a court might allow him to revoke anyway. 92
C. When an Election Appears To Be Unavailable
or Inconsequential
Occasionally a taxpayer will file his tax return without making an
election because under his view of the facts or the law an election is
unavailable or inconsequential. Since the regulations provide in some
situations that failure to elect precludes election at a later date without
the Commissioner's consent, 93 the consequences of such failure can be
disastrous.
90. Wilber Natl Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120 (1935); Darling v. Commissioner, 49
F.2d 111, 113 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 866 (1931); James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040,
1148-58 (1928). See also J. Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation §§ 60.14-.16 (rev. ed.
1970).
91. For an excellent discussion of estoppel as it relates to federal tax controversies see
Maguire & Zimet, supra note 57, at 1293-1318.
92. See notes 155-62 infra and accompanying text
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-3(b)(1) (1957) (election to deduct research and experimental expendi-




When, however, the taxpayer's failure to make an election results
from ignorance that an election is available, the taxpayer has a strong
claim for amending his return. In an early case,94 a corporate taxpayer
had apparently sold a subsidiary corporation to a third party reporting
its income for three years on a separate basis. When a court later
determined that the sale of a subsidiary was ineffective, the taxpayer
moved to revoke its separate returns and to file on a consolidated basis
with the subsidiary for the three years during which the taxpayer had
thought it no longer owned the subsidiary. The Commissioner resisted
the taxpayer's amendment on the basis of the 1921 Revenue Act,
which provided that a taxpayer who filed on a separate basis for any
year was precluded from amending his return to file on a consolidated
basis for that year. 95
The court held for the taxpayer. Since the taxpayer did not know
that it still owned the subsidiary, the court reasoned that its initial
separate returns did not constitute an election against filing on a
consolidated basis. 96 Despite the holding of J.E. Riley Investment Co.
v. Commissioner, 97 it is unfair to bind a taxpayer to an unconscious
election when, under his view of the facts or law, 98 no election was
available. 99
A more complicated problem arises when the taxpayer is aware that
he has an election, but thinks the election is inconsequential because he
has no taxable income for the year of the election. As a result he may
neglect to make the required election or he may make a hastily
considered election which proves to be unwise. The response of the
courts to a subsequent attempt by the taxpayer to make the proper
election has sometimes been unfavorable, 00 but more often has been
generous to the taxpayer.' 0 ' The language of one opinion is fairly
typical:
94. Dexter Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 23 B.T.A. 227 (1931).
95. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(a), 42 Stat. 227.
96. 23 B.T.A. at 235-36.
97. 311 U.S. 55 (1940). See notes 45-53 supra and accompanying text.
98. In Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1942), a taxpayer failed to take a
specific gift exemption because he did not know that a certain transfer constituted a gift. He was
allowed to amend his gift tax return and claim the exemption after the Commissioner successfully
characterized the transfer as a gift The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that a
mistake of law would not serve to excuse the taxpayer. Id. at 569. See notes 29-35 supra and
accompanying text.
99. This is another ground for criticizing the holding against the taxpayer in John D. Biggers,
39 B.T.A. 480 (1939). See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
100. Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322, 330 (1964).
101. Gentsch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 151 F.2d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 1945); Lucas v.
Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 62 F.2d 951, 952 (6th Cir. 1933). An interesting pair of companion cases
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[W]here no tax is assessed and none assessable, no matter how the expenses be treated,
and where the initial return is filed upon incomplete knowledge of the material facts...
it seems to us that the initial return may properly be regarded as tentative in its nature,
and as not constituting an election.' 0
2
This reasoning overlooks the fact that an election may have impor-
tant tax ramifications for years before and after the election is made.
Consider, for example, this common factual situation:103 a taxpayer
incurs research and experimental costs in a given taxable year which
under the Code he may deduct entirely in that year or amortize and
deduct over a five year (or greater) period.10 4 Since he has no taxable
income for the year, he believes that an election for that year is
unnecessary and hence he makes none. But whether he elects to deduct
or to amortize the expenses may have a profound effect on his tax
liability for later or earlier tax years. If he deducts the costs, he will
have a net operating loss in the year of the deduction which, subject to
limitations of section 172,105 may be carried back to offset income in
earlier years or may be carried forward to offset income in later years.
If, on the other hand, he amortizes the costs, only a ratable part of the
expenses will be deductible in the first year, resulting in a much
smaller net operating loss for that year. The remainder (and bulk) of
the expenses, however, will be deductible over the amortization
period. Depending on the choice he makes the tax consequences for
subsequent years may be considerably different.10 6
If the taxpayer was unaware of the importance of the election when
he made his choice (or had his choice made for him by default), it is
understandable that a court would want to rescue him from an unwise
election or from an election by default. But a court should hesitate to
grant relief after the due date of the original election because the
taxpayer's choice becomes much easier if he can make the election
knowing his taxable income for subsequent years. 0 7 Hence, a court
are Pittston-Duryea Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1941), and Kehoe-Berge
Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1941). In the former the court held for the
taxpayer specifically because he had no taxable income and an election %as, according to the
court, meaningless; in the latter the court held against the taxpayer because he had taxable
income.
102. Lucas v. Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 62 F.2d 951, 952 (6th Cir. 1933).
103. Both Lucas v. Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 62 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1933) and Estate of Richard
R_ lbur, 43 T.C. 322 (1964) involved tax situations similar to this example.
104. InL Rev. Code of 1954, § 174(a)-(b).
105. Id. § 172. Generally a taxpayer may carry back a net operating loss to each of the three
preceding taxable years and may carry forward a net operating loss to each of the five succeeding
taxable years. Id. § 172(b).
106. At least one court has lucidly analyzed the importance of such seemingly meaningless tax
elections. Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322, 330 (1964).
107. In the example under discussion if the taxpayer's income is high for the years im-
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which allows a subsequent election or permits a change in a prior
election may be shifting the risk of his future income flow from the
taxpayer to the government. In the ordinary case this risk is on the
taxpayer. There seems to be no reason to shift the risk to the
government simply because the taxpayer regarded the election as
meaningless.
A similar argument for denying relief could be made in the case of a
taxpayer whose failure to elect is due to ignorance that an election is
available. Here again the taxpayer who is allowed to elect late has the
benefit of hindsight. Yet courts allow such late elections on the ground
that it is unfair to penalize a taxpayer for failing to make an election if
he was not aware that he had a right to make an election. 108 When,
however, the taxpayer knows he has an election and still ignores it, his
claim to relief is less convincing, though even here, a compromise
solution allowing the taxpayer to make a late election might be
appropriate. This would allow the taxpayer to make a late election if
he can prove that he would have made the same choice on his original
return, had he realized the importance of making an election at that
time. 10 9 But a court should not allow a late election if the taxpayer's
choice is motivated by later events which he could not know of at the
time of the original election. There is no reason to give the taxpayer
who neglects an election an advantage over the taxpayer who elects on
time and at the risk of future events.
V. SITUATIONS IN WHICH COURTS Do NOT FAVOR
THE TAXPAYER
A. Penalty for Failing to File a Return on Time
Occasionally, courts have refused to allow a taxpayer to make an
election when the taxpayer's return on which the election would
normally be due was not filed until after the filing time specified in the
Code. 10 The motive of the courts seems to be to punish taxpayers
who fail to file their tax returns on time:
mediately following the election, he can deduct the expenses and thereby create a net operating
loss to offset the income of those years. If, by contrast, his income is low for the years
immediately following the election, it would be better to amortize the expenses, thereby allocating
a good part of the costs to future years when his income may be higher.
108. See the cases cited in note 101 supra.
109. See notes 120 & 152 infra and accompanying text.
110. Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870, 881-82 (1951); Sarah Briarly, 29 B.T.A. 256,
258 (1933).
It should be noted that the issues involved in an election made on a late return are similar to
those discussed heretofore in cases involving taxpayers who file their returns on time, but fall to
make a required election with their returns. Curiously, the courts have in general been more
amenable to late elections in these latter cases. See notes 93-109 supra and accompanying text.
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[Tiaxpayers voluntarily filing returns and making timely election are bound by their
choice. To allow a choice where the taxpayer sits supinely by until by the diligence of
the Government it is discovered that a tax is due would put a premium on inertia that
certainly is not within the spirit of our system of taxation. If any class of taxpayers is
entitled to claim a preference, it consists of those who have complied with the
statute. 
1
There are a number of answers to this argument. First, one major
premise of the court's reasoning is clearly unsound since courts do in
fact allow taxpayers on occasion to revoke elections made on a timely
filed return. 112 It would not necessarily be inconsistent or unfair to
allow a taxpayer who failed to file a timely return to make a late
election. Second, the Internal Revenue Code imposes a penalty for
failing to file a return on time" 13 and it is arguable that courts should
not impose an additional judicial penalty by refusing to allow a
taxpayer to make an election which he is entitled to make simply be-
cause he has filed his return after the due date.
Certain sections of the Code and the regulations impose a time limit
for making elections. Under section 248 of the Code, for example, the
taxpayer must elect the benefits of that section "not later than the time
prescribed by law for filing the return for such taxable year . . , . 4
Similarly, under Treasury Regulation 1.453-8(a)(1), the taxpayer must
elect the installment method "on an income tax return for the taxable
year of the election, filed on or before the time specified . . . for filing
such return. 115 In cases where such a refusal by the Service to accept
an election on a late return has firm statutory or regulatory' " 6 support,
a court should not upset the Service's decision.
But other cases are more promising for the taxpayer. Consider, for
example, a taxpayer who files a late return on which he wishes to elect
an accelerated depreciation method for a certain asset. 17 Such an
election should be made on the return for the first taxable year for
111. Sarah Briarly, 29 B.T.A. 256, 259 (1933).
112. See notes 70-71, 94-96 & 101 supra and accompanying text.
113. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6651(a)(1).
114. Id. § 248(c). See note 20 supra.
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(a)(1), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. Bull. 197, 206 (emphasis added). It
should be noted that Sarah Briarly, see note 110 supra and accompanying text, also involved an
installment sale election, but the regulations prior to the 1954 Code did not explicitly require that
an installment sale election be made on a duly filed return. See Treas. Reg. § 3.44 (1939).
116. The Code authorizes the Secretary or his delegate to prescribe regulations governing the
election of the installment method. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 453(a)(1),(b)(1). Treasury
Regulations are valid "unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" wvith the statute. Commis-
sioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948). The requirement in the regulations
that an election of the installment sale method be made on a duly filed return does not seem to be
unreasonable.
117. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b) authorizes a taxpayer to use certain methods of
accelerated depreciation.
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which the taxpayer claims a depreciation deduction for the asset.'l l
However, since neither the Code nor the regulations specifies that a
taxpayer must make his election on a return which is duly filed, 119 the
taxpayer's election on a late return ordinarily should be accepted by
the Service or, if the Service refuses, by a court. As with other late
elections, however, the taxpayer who wishes to file an election on a
late return must demonstrate that he would have made the same
choice had he filed his return on time, and that his choice of a
particular alternative is not due to subsequent events.
120
B. Revocations in Response to an Audit by the Internal
Revenue Service
When a taxpayer makes an election under the Code, his choice is
often determined by his opinion of the tax consequences of transactions
entirely distinct from the one involving the election. If the Internal
Revenue Service upon audit succeeds in attacking the taxpayer's
opinion of these other transactions, the taxpayer's election may turn
out to be disastrous. 121 The question then arises as to whether the
taxpayer may revoke or change his election in response to the changes
in his tax situation caused by the audit.
The courts have generally been antagonistic to taxpayer revocations
in response to tax audits. 122 Some courts base their refusal to allow a
118. Failure to adopt an accelerated method of depreciation mandates the use of tile
straightline method. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-l(a) (1956).
119. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b),(c),(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b) (1956).
120. See note 152 infra and accompanying text.
121. An example is the election by a shareholder to be taxed in a liquidation under section 333
of the Code, which provides generally that a shareholder does not recognize gain on a liquidation
pursuant to that section. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 333(a). Under section 333(e), however, if the
corporation has earnings and profits at the time of the liquidation, a non-corporate shareholder
will be taxed on his ratable share of such earnings and profits as a dividend, i.e., as ordinary
income. Id. §§ 333(e), 301(cXl). Since gain on a liquidation is ordinarily capital gain, see
§ 331(a)(1), the shareholder would be badly advised to elect section 333 if the corporation tias
considerable earnings and profits, since the election would simply convert capital gain to ordinary
income. See B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders,
11.20-.24 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Bittker & Eustice]. Often the shareholder elects
section 333 believing that the corporation has little if any earnings and profits, a belief which the
IRS may prove erroneous on audit. The question then becomes whether the taxpayer may revoke
his section 333 election and be taxed under the normal rules for corporate liquidations.
At least four reported cases involve taxpayers who wanted to revoke elections under section 333
or its predecessor, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 63, § I12(b)(7), 58 Stat. 40. See Raymond v.
United States, 269 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1959); Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 592 (5th
Cir. 1952); Aaron Cohen, 63 T.C. No. 49 (Feb. 3, 1975); Frank T. Shull, 30 T.C. 821 (1958),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 271 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1959).
122. Of the eleven cases which squarely present this question, three went in favor of the
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revocation on the traditional mistake of fact and mistake of law
dichotomy, 123 but this distinction is no more satisfactory a ground for
deciding these specific cases than it is for deciding revocation cases
generally. 124 Other courts 125 rely on either of two leading Supreme
Court opinions disallowing revocations, 126 but neither of these Su-
preme Court cases involved a taxpayer who was seeking to revoke an
election in response to a tax audit. At least one court has denied relief
to the taxpayer on the grounds that the attempted revocation was the
result of hindsight which "cannot ... destroy the binding effect of an
election .... -127 This too misses the mark, for the type of hindsight
which should preclude a taxpayer from revoking an election is a
knowledge of non-tax events which subsequently make the election less
favorable than the taxpayer thought at the time of his election. It is the
risk of future non-tax events which the taxpayer assumes when he
makes an election, not the risk that he misconstrued the tax effect of
transactions already completed at the time of his election. 128
Perhaps the most common argument raised against the taxpayer is
that problems of tax administration would increase considerably if, in
response to an audit, a taxpayer could revoke an election which was
already examined as one part of the audit. 129 Although problems of tax
administration increase somewhat whenever a taxpayer is allowed to
change an election, it is hard to see how the presence of a tax audit
makes administration any more difficult. In fact, while the taxpayer's
entire return is subject to scrutiny, it would be convenient for both the
taxpayer and the Service to make changes in the return, including a
taxpayer, eight against him. For the taxpayer. Mamula v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir.
1965); Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1952); Gentsch v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 151 F.2d 997 (6th Cir. 1945). Against the taxpayer. Estate of Darby v. Wiseman,
323 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1963); Raymond v. United States, 269 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1959); Jacobs v.
Commissioner, 224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955); Aaron Cohen, 63 T.C. No. 49 (Feb. 3, 1975); Estate
of George Stamos, 55 T.C. 468 (1970); Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322 (1964); M.
Pauline Casey, 38 T.C. 357 (1962); Frank T. Shul, 30 T.C. 821 (1958), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 271 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1959).
123. Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792, 794 (10th Cir. 1963); Raymond v. United
States, 269 F.2d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1959); Aaron Cohen, 63 T.C. No. 49 (Feb. 3, 1975).
124. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
125. Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1955); Estate of George Stamos, 55
T.C. 468, 473-74 (1970); Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322, 330-31 (1964).
126. J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55 (1940); Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch,
304 U.S. 191 (1938).
127. Peter Mamula, 41 T.C. 572, 576 (1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1965).
128. See notes 145-51 infra and accompanying text. On appeal in Mamula the Court of
Appeals recognized that hindsight was not a factor in the revocation. 346 F.2d at 1018.
129. Estate of George Stamos, 55 T.C. 468, 474-75 (1970); Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43
T.C. 322, 330-31 (1964); M. Pauline Casey, 38 T.C. 357, 386 (1962).
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revocation of a tax election, especially if the taxpayer originally made
the election on the very return (or returns) being audited. 130
It is, however, important to recognize that certain tax elections in
themselves increase the burdens of tax administration. The election by
a shareholder to be taxed in a corporate liquidation under section 333
is a good example. 13 1 In the usual corporate liquidation the earnings
and profits of the liquidating corporation are generally irrelevant to the
tax consequences of the liquidation, since the shareholders' gain (or
loss) is computed without reference to the corporation's tax history. 32
When, however, a shareholder elects to be taxed in a liquidation under
section 333, the corporation's earnings and profits become vitally
important, 133 and consequently the Service may have to examine the
corporation's entire tax history to determine its earnings and profits at
the time of the liquidation.134 If the Service increases the corporation's
earnings and profits and thereby increases the shareholder's dividend
income, the shareholder may seek to revoke his section 333 election.
These facts present the Service's strongest argument against a revoca-
tion,' 35 for a taxpayer should perhaps be estopped from revoking an
election when it was only because of the election that the Service made
an otherwise unnecessary tax examination.' 36
130. Some elections, for example installment sales under section 453 of the Code, may have
been made years before the tax audit; here the administrative argument has more force, especially
if the statute of limitations for the year of the election has already run. See Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 6511 and notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
131. See note 121 supra.
132. See Bittker & Eustice, supra note 121, at 11.01, .03.
133. See note 121 supra.
134. Under section 333(e) the taxpayer is taxed on his ratable share of the corporation's
earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 333(e).
135. Curiously none of the four cases involving elections under § 333 (or its predecessor in the
1939 Internal Revenue Code) presents the argument of administrative burden in this, its most
forceful aspect. See cases cited in note 121 supra.
136. Despite this argument the taxpayer still ought to prevail if he presents a convincing case
that it would be manifestly unjust to bind him to his election. In Aaron Cohen, 63 T.C. No. 49
(Feb. 3, 1975), the taxpayer-shareholders elected to be taxed under section 333 of the Code in the
belief that a sale of corporate assets at a profit was made by the shareholders and not by the
liquidating corporation. The Commissioner argued that the corporation had made the sale and
that gain on the sale was therefore taxable to the corporation. See Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). Under section 337 of the Code, gains on sales pursuant to
certain liquidations are not taxable to the liquidating corporation, but section 337 is not
applicable to a section 333 liquidation. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 337(c)(1)(B).
The consequences to the shareholders of a finding in favor of the Commissioner in Aaron
Cohen could hardly be more disastrous, for there would be a tax at the corporate level on tie
gain, and the gain attributed to the corporation would increase the corporation's earnings and
profits, thereby increasing the amount of dividend income to the shareholders on the section 333
liquidation. Id. § 333(e). Faced with this impending catastrophe the shareholders sought to
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One subtle and often unexpressed reason underlying a decision
against the taxpayer is that he was not blameless in the error that led
to his election. Two opinions against the taxpayer, for example,
emphasize that the taxpayer offered no evidence to justify the tax error
behind his election.' 37 And in two decisions in favor of the taxpayer,
both courts relied heavily on the finding that the taxpayer's mistake
was innocent, and that there was no evidence of fraud or understate-
ment in the original return. 38 In short, by exercising this power to
deny or allow a revocation, courts seem to punish those taxpayers who
cannot prove their innocence, and to reward those who can.
As with the problem of failing to file a return, 139 the punitive
approach to revocations in response to tax audits cannot be justified.
Suppose, for example, that a taxpayer-shareholder makes a section 333
election knowing that the liquidating corporation has deliberately
understated its earnings and profits. While a tax statute might provide
that an election in these circumstances should be irrevocable, the
present Internal Revenue Code does not contain such a provision, but
rather relies on other harsh and specific penalties for a taxpayer guilty
of tax fraud. 140 Given these rather specific penalties a court should not
create its own penalty of refusing to allow the taxpayer to revoke his
election. Nonetheless, a decision against a taxpayer might be justifiable
not on punitive grounds, but simply because the taxpayer has failed to
meet his burden of proof that the election was a mistake at all. 141
When the mistake on the taxpayer's return is the result not of fraud,
but of negligence, he should be allowed to change his election. Again
revoke their election under section 333, apparently hoping for the following tax consequences: (1)
that they would receive the usual capital gain treatment under section 331, rather than dividend
treatment, on their gains realized on the liquidation; and (2) that the corporation would escape tax
on the gain by virtue of section 337.
Despite the taxpayers' plight the Tax Court refused to allow them to revoke their elections. An
appeal by some of the shareholders to the Second Circuit has been dismissed; an appeal by the
other shareholders to the Third Circuit is still pending. An interesting situation may arise if the
Third Circuit allows a revocation. As a result the eighty percent shareholder approval require-
ment for a section 333 election may no longer be satisfied. Id. § 333(c)(1). The shareholders in the
Second Circuit will then have a strong argument that, since one of the requirements for a section
333 election is no longer satisfied, they should be taxed under the usual rules for corporate
liquidation.
137. Aaron Cohen, 63 T.C. No. 49 (Feb. 3, 1975); Estate of George Stamos, 55 T.C. 468, 476
(1970).
138. Meyer's Estate v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1952); Gentsch v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 151 F.2d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1945).
139. See notes 110-20 supra and accompanying text.
140. Both civil and criminal penalties are imposed for fraud. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 6653(b), 7201, 7206, 7207.
141. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
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the Code provides specific penalties for negligence, 142 and thus a court
should not impose its own. Furthermore, a showing by the taxpayer
that his misstatement was not deliberate will satisfy his burden of
proving that a mistake has in fact occurred.
A more common situation involves a taxpayer who is guilty neither
of fraud nor negligence, but who submits a return which puts the best
possible light on the transactions which it reports. When the taxpayer
makes an election on his return, he knows that the election will become
disadvantageous if his own view of the tax consequences of the
transactions reported on the return proves to be incorrect. He may
even be aware that it is unlikely that his own view will prevail.
Though this is a closer case, this taxpayer too should probably be
allowed to revoke his election 143 unless, as a consequence of the
election, the Service had to undertake a tax examination which, but
for the election, would have been unnecessary.
144
C. Hindsight Revocations
This Article in discussing the problem of the late election concluded
in part that a taxpayer ought not to be allowed to make a late election
when his choice results from a knowledge of events subsequent to the
filing deadline for the original election. 145 It should not be surprising
that a similar issue arises when taxpayers attempt to revoke elections
already made.
Perhaps the simplest example is that of a taxpayer who, in a duly
filed election, elects to depreciate an asset on the straightline basis. A
few years later he decides that, because his income was unexpectedly
high for the years immediately following his acquisition of the asset, he
would have been better off from a tax point of view under an
accelerated method of depreciation. This would allocate a greater
share of the deductions for depreciation to the earlier taxable years to
offset his unusually high income. Under these facts a court should
reject an attempt by the taxpayer to revoke his original election. Like
many other elections, 14 6 an election of straightline depreciation is,
quite simply, a gamble in which the taxpayer is betting against
142. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6653(a) imposes a civil penalty for "negligence or intentional
disregard of rules and regulations."
143. The government may argue that no mistake occurred which would entitle the taxpayer
to relief. The taxpayer may argue, however, that the government should receive, as a result of
the audit, no more revenue than it would receive on a corrected tax return which would include
all the proper elections to which the taxpayer is entitled.
144. See notes 131-36 supra and accompanying text.
145. See notes 107 & 120 supra and accompanying text.
146. Examples may be found in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 173, 174, 248, and 453.
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unusually high income in the first years after his acquisition of the
asset. 147 Further, it is a gamble in which the Code and Regulations
contemplate that the risk of unforeseen events will be on the tax-
payer. 148 To allow the taxpayer to shift that risk to the government
would be unwise from both a policy and a practical standpoint. 14 9 A
number of cases explicitly follow this reasoning,150 and it is quite likely
that a few other decisions151 rejecting taxpayer attempts to revoke
elections are implicitly grounded in the courts' unexpressed realization
that it was hindsight alone which motivated the taxpayers to discard
elections which later proved to be unprofitable.
A more debatable question arises when the taxpayer can prove that
his election was a mistake even when made. Suppose in the example
under discussion that the taxpayer establishes that he did not know at
the time he adopted straightline depreciation that accelerated depre-
ciation was allowed by the Code,1 s 2 and that, had he been aware of
this alternative, he would have depreciated the asset on that basis.
Assuming further that subsequent events made accelerated deprecia-
tion even more attractive, a court faces the question of whether to
allow a taxpayer to revoke an election which, though originally based
on a mistake, has been proven by hindsight to be even more unwise.
On the side of the taxpayer is the argument that, as a general rule,
an election mistaken in its inception should be revocable within a
reasonable time so long as wisdom acquired by hindsight is not the
inducement for the revocation. If the taxpayer proves that but for the
147. A taxpayer may choose straightline depreciation for two other reasons. One is simplicity,
since it is quite easy to compute the allowable amount of straightline depreciation on an asset by
dividing the cost of the asset less its salvage value by its useful life. A second reason would be to
avoid the possible recapture as ordinary income of depreciation in the event the property is sold in
a later taxable year when the taxpayer's income may be high. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1245,
1250. Even if the taxpayer elected straightline depreciation for either of these reasons, he should
still be precluded from revoking the election.
148. The Code explicitly provides that a taxpayer may shift at any time from declining
balance depreciation to straightline depreciation. Id. § 167(e)(1). This suggests that a shift from
straightline to accelerated depreciation is not permissible in the absence of the usual cir-
cumstances justifying the revocation of an election by a taxpayer.
149. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
150. J.E. Riley Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 55, 59 (1940); Estate of Richard R.
Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322, 330 (1964); Peter Mfamula, 41 T.C. 572, 576 (1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 1016
(9th Cir. 1965); Stewart v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 221, 229-30 (D. Neb. 1951).
151. Pacific Nat'1 Co. v. welch, 304 U.S. 191 (1938); Boone County Coal Corp. v. United
States, 121 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1941); Youngblood v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Tex.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 507 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1975); Estate of E.P. Lamberth, 31 T.C. 302
(1958).
152. This is not very likely since the very subsection in the Code which authorizes straightline




initial mistake he would have made a different election, his case has
some merit. For the government, the practical argument is that to
allow a taxpayer to revoke when hindsight may be a motivating factor
for the revocation would open a Pandora's box of claims by taxpayers,
disgruntled by unforeseen events, that their elections were mistaken
from the start. Choosing between these opposing positions is difficult,
but in an area as riddled with complications as tax elections, perhaps
courts ought to favor, in any close case, the fairness argument of the
taxpayer over the fear that the floodgates will be opened to spurious
claims. If the fear proves in practice to be well-founded, Congress or
the courts can always close the locks.
VI. CONCLUSION
The struggle between taxpayers and the Commissioner regarding the
revocation of tax elections and the filing of late elections basically
involves two important and conflicting issues of tax policy. On the side
of the taxpayer is the policy that a taxpayer should not have to pay
more in taxes than the Code requires simply because he misconstrued,
or failed to make, a tax election. On the side of government is the
argument that the burdens of tax administration should not be in-
creased by accommodating a taxpayer who, through his own fault,
made an incorrect tax election.
Many of the early opinions fail to analyze, or even to recognize,
these basic issues of tax policy, but instead focus on an inapposite rule
borrowed from equity that a mistake of fact serves to excuse an
election, but a mistake of law does not. 153 This distinction is hardly a
plausible theory for deciding cases which involve an important policy
conflict between the fairness arguments of the taxpayer and the
practical arguments of the government.
Following the nearly universal demise of this mistake of fact-mistake
of law dichotomy, the trend of the majority of decisions15 4 has been
toward accepting the government's argument that the burdens of tax
administration would become too severe if taxpayers were free to
revoke or change tax elections. It is surprising that many courts have
embraced the government's position without question, even though the
practical difficulties on the taxpayer's side in making a wise and proper
election are considerable. 155 The government rarely has been able to
153. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
154. The courts have held for the government in the vast majority of cases reported In the
past quarter century. In nearly all these decisions in favor of the government the courts relied, at
least in part, on the government's "burdens of administration" argument.
155. See notes 6-22 supra and accompanying text.
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point to a specific problem in tax administration which would become
significantly more acute if the court decided in favor of the tax-
payer 156
On the other hand, courts should not blindly grant relief to any
taxpayer who claims that it would be unfair to hold him to a mistaken
election. Since it is the taxpayer who is at fault, however innocently,
he should prove the major elements of his case before a court accedes
to his revocation.157 Furthermore, the taxpayer should be required to
move within three years to revoke an unwise election, for any delay in
such cases is likely to magnify the problems of tax administration.'-,
Once the taxpayer meets these basic procedural hurdles, however,
his claim to relief is strong. No longer should the government prevail
simply by alluding to amorphous administrative burdens, or by alleg-
ing its supposed discretion to reject amended returns. 159 Instead, the
taxpayer should prevail unless the government establishes either (1)
that a specific administrative burden would increase by permitting the
revocation; 160 or (2) that the taxpayer's revocation or late election is
motivated by a knowledge acquired through hindsight of events
subsequent to the date for his original election. 161 But if the gov-
156. The only cases in which the government established a specific administrative reason to
support its position are Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194 (1938) (revocation would
affect a number of taxable years, not just the year for which taxpayer claimed a refund);
Youngblood v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1974), affd per curiam, 507 F.2d
1263 (5th Cir. 1975) (revocation after four years, arguably too long a period to permit a
revocation); Estate of Richard R. Wilbur, 43 T.C. 322, 330-31 (1964) (change from capitalizing to
deducting certain expenses likely to affect a number of tax years, not just the year under audit);
K. Pauline Casey, 38 T.C. 357, 386 (1962) (administrative problems would "vastly increase" if
taxpayers were permitted to change "their method of taking depreciation every time a change in
basis or estimated useful life was determined.").
157. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
159. An occasional court has held against the taxpayer partly on the grounds that, unce the
acceptance of an amended return is within the discretion of the Commissioner, a court should not
upset his decision unless he was "arbitrary and capricious" in refusing to accept the amendment.
Youngblood v. United States, 388 F. Supp. at 155; see Keeler v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d
707, 710 (10th Cir. 1950). It is true that, as a matter of procedure vithin the Internal Revenue
Service, the Commissioner is not required to accept an amended return whether the amendment
involves a change of election or a simple miscalculation on the original return. Miskovsky v.
United States, 414 F.2d 954, 955 (3d Cir. 1969); Kunkel & Co., 3 B.T.A. 133, 137 (1925). But the
taxpayer is not without a remedy if the Commissioner rejects the amended return. He can bring a
jurisdictionally proper action either in a district court or in the Tax Court to convince the court
that the amended return (including the change of election) represents a correct statement of his
tax obligations. Miskovsky v. United States, 414 F.2d 954, 956 (3d Cir. 1969); Morrow, Becker &
Ewing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 1, 2-3 (5th Cir. 1932). Once an action has been brought, of
course, the decision whether to allow the change of election is with the court.
160. See notes 131-36 & 156 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 145-51 supra and accompanying text.
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ernment simply presents evidence that hindsight may have been a
motivating factor in the revocation or late election, the taxpayer should
prevail if he is able to refute the government's evidence by dem-
onstrating that he would have chosen the same alternative even
without the benefit of hindsight. 162
It will be difficult to reverse the pro-government trend in the
decisions since Riley. In the meantime the issue will continue to
produce uncertainty and litigation. Rather than await the results of the
judicial process, it may be advisable for Congress to enact legislation
governing the revocability of elections. The main difficulty, however,
is that a statutory rule which would be satisfactory with respect to
certain elections might produce havoc when applied to other elections.
Some elections are much easier with the advantage of hindsight; others
are not. Some elections or revocations produce administrative burdens
for the Internal Revenue Service; others do not. Congress could simply
prohibit all revocations and late elections or it could simply allow all
revocations for a limited period. The former would be too harsh on
taxpayers, the latter too generous.
Probably the best alternative is for Congress to enact a statute
explicitly prohibiting revocations after a statutory limitation period of
three years. 163 The implication of such a provision would be that
revocations within the three year period are permissible. However,
Congress could make clear in the committee reports that a revocation
or late election should not be allowed even within the limitation period
if the revocation would create a specific administrative problem or if
the revocation is motivated by hindsight. Individual taxpayer prob-
lems should still be decided on a case-by-case basis, but at least
Congress will have provided useful guidance to taxpayers, to the
Service, and to the courts.
162. See notes 109, 120 & 152 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
